The acrimonious divorce of Diane Rosemin-Culligan and David Culligan, founders of the London City Lionesses, has resulted in two noteworthy judgments from Mr Justice MacDonald.
The Culligans' lifestyle was largely funded by the husband’s Bitcoin fortune, which grew from a £10,000 investment in 2012 to £20m by 2017. Their reported £27.3m fortune included the family home (a luxurious nine-bedroom property on Eaton Road, Primrose Hill), the husband’s buy-to-let property portfolio, various investments, and pensions.
Following a 40-year relationship and three children, the Culligans had broadly agreed on an equal division of their matrimonial assets, which is typical for a relationship of such length. However, the structure of this division was less straightforward due to the wife’s desire to retain a family home in excess of her needs, valuation issues, and allegations of conduct and non-disclosure.
A significant problem was a multi-million-pound shareholding in the husband’s name which the court found to be illiquid and not easily convertible to cash. If kept entirely by the husband, he would not have immediate access to this asset to apply towards his needs. To achieve fairness Mr Justice MacDonald applied the sharing principle that originated from the case Wells v Wells [2002] EWCA Civ 476. This allowed the court to achieve an equal division of the assets by apportioning the illiquid shareholding between the parties, both of whom would have to wait to realise their portion of its value.
Although acknowledging that “on the face of it, it is difficult to see how the wife’s current needs as a single person extend to a nine-bedroom, seven-bathroom property” the judge recognised the wife’s emotional connection to the family home and concluded that “a fair distribution of the assets can be achieved without the need to sell” the property. Consequently, the family home was transferred to the wife as part of her half of the total assets, together with 30% of the illiquid shareholding in the husband’s name. This left the wife with much more liquid capital than the husband even though an equal division of the assets was achieved overall.
The husband has sought permission to appeal. Although the grounds are unknown, one could speculate that it might include submissions based on a misapplication of the Wells sharing principle. The husband might, for example, argue that the court's application of that principle was unfair because the lion’s share of illiquid assets were allocated to him.
A second judgment addressed the eye watering costs incurred, a combined total of £1.386m. The husband made an application that the wife should pay his costs, which were less than half that of her’s. Despite finding that the husband had failed to negotiate reasonably and had refused the wife’s mediation proposals, the court ordered the wife to pay £84,450 (20%) of his costs. The court rejected the wife’s claims of unreasonable litigation behaviour and non-disclosure, finding her complaints "obviously and demonstrably hollow". However, the court did find that she had concealed financial details related to undisclosed income post-separation. Additionally, the court rejected the wife’s application for anonymisation of the judgment, a rare occurrence since the retirement of Mr Justice Mostyn.