The High Court has handed down its judgment on the removal of trustees in a dispute over the administration of a discretionary trust created under the will of Graham Cheslyn-Curtis, founder of Millpledge Group, a veterinary medical products business. When Graham died in 2018, his estate was worth over £8m. His will created a 125-year discretionary trust for the benefit of his partner Suzanne Smith, her children Nathan and Leah, his son Guy, and their descendants. Graham appointed four trustees: two business advisers, Ian “Paddy” Campbell and Malcolm Taylor, and two family members, his sister Sarah and Suzanne’s brother Maldwyn.

Graham left a detailed letter of wishes setting out his vision for the future. He wanted Nathan and Leah to run Millpledge under the guidance of Paddy and Malcolm, with profits reinvested for long-term growth. As the judge observed, Graham described this as an attempt to “rule from the grave,” but what he intended was continuity of his life’s work. That vision quickly unravelled. Relations deteriorated after Graham’s death, and Nathan and Leah were eventually removed as directors and dismissed as employees. The claimants then sought to replace all four trustees, alleging breaches of duty and bias.

The court’s jurisdiction to remove trustees comes from section 41 of the Trustee Act 1925 and its inherent supervisory powers. The guiding principle is that removal must serve the welfare of the beneficiaries and ensure proper administration of the trust. As the judgment emphasised, “trustees exist for the benefit of those to whom the creator of the trust has given the trust estate.” Replacing trustees is a serious step, not taken lightly, and the settlor’s choice of trustees and the costs of professional replacements are relevant factors.

The claimants raised six grounds for removal, including failure to notify beneficiaries, failure to provide accounts, lack of impartiality, inadequate independent oversight of Millpledge, and allowing a non-beneficiary to occupy trust property. Most were dismissed. For example, while trustees should provide accounts, a single overlooked request was not enough to justify removal.

The decisive issue was the hostility displayed by the trustees toward the claimants. In his evidence, Paddy expressed strong negative views about Nathan and Leah, describing them in terms that suggested deep personal animosity, calling them “entitled and greedy” and accusing them of having “a sole focus on the acquisition of money and control” driven by “deep-rooted greed’’. Malcolm endorsed those views. Although Paddy later sought to soften his language, the court found that these attitudes created a real risk to impartial administration of the trust. This went beyond ordinary friction and could affect decisions on distributions and other trust matters.

The court ordered the removal of Paddy and Malcolm and said that an independent professional trustee should be appointed to act alongside Sarah and Maldwyn. This solution preserves continuity consistent with Graham’s wishes while introducing impartial oversight, particularly in relation to Millpledge’s governance.

This case illustrates the limitations of detailed succession planning. Letters of wishes, however comprehensive, cannot guarantee harmony or prevent disputes. It also shows that hostility matters when it undermines a trustees’ objectivity. Professional trustees can provide stability where family and business interests collide, and their involvement should be considered at the succession planning stage. It will be interesting to see how the Judge deals with the consequentials and balances the cost consequences of claimants who failed to engage in the pre-action protocol but having ultimately succeeded (in part) in their removal claim against the “neutral” trustees’ attempts to cling to office.